|
湛江翻譯公司關(guān)鍵字：From such a perspective I have to evaluate what Chinese state-owned enterprise reform is successful or unsuccessful. Mentioned enterprise system to solve the two problems, one motivation problem, namely the operator selection mechanism. My view is that China's ten years of reform in addressing the incentive mechanism is relatively successful in addressing the operator selection mechanism is unsuccessful. Why is the state-owned enterprise reform in addressing the incentive mechanism is the relative success? Internal members (including managers and workers) work incentives depends on the distribution of residual claims. China's actual reforms, such as the contract system, are the residual claims and control business outcomes from the government, in this sense is the reform of enterprise ownership. Residual claim outcome within the enterprise, business managers, workers have the enthusiasm, of course, they are not the legal owner. This appears the type of problems such as corruption. In my opinion, the reform of China in the past ten years achieved a great deal of very important reason is that managers can not share but can actually form the possession of residual claims. Managers Chihepiaodu is a form obtained from the remaining. It had a negative effect, but more active role. From the perspective of incentives, it is important not how many managers hold the remaining nominally, but in fact how much the remaining share. A given enterprise is "State", "Chihepiaodu" possession for the remainder of the managers actually provide a channel. For this reason, making the managers personal income and business performance in fact the correlation between the high and far and policies and regulations on statistical correlation. One obvious fact is that business managers of enterprises with good performance the house, take the car, travel at their hotel, operating results are better than bad business. This fact has a positive effect of the residual claim, which limits the government will profit from the profit-making enterprises the freedom to transfer of loss-making enterprises, which is equal to strengthen all the enterprise's budget constraint. Extreme to say that if all of the profit-making enterprises will profit themselves, apart from printing money, are there any way to subsidize loss-making enterprises it?
The argument is also part of the answer to the question: Why is the state-owned enterprise reform in addressing the relative effectiveness of the incentive mechanism is not reflected on the profit targets? Profit is net of all costs remaining after, when companies have a variety of ways to enter the domestic consumption, cost, profit in itself a measure of business performance is not an effective indicator. Now free to increase the cost of Chinese state-owned enterprises, to conceal the fact that profit is obvious. Chinese enterprises in the past known to exaggerate the high reported, and now become fashionable to conceal profits. The reason is simple, reported the state, hiding under their own. The actual situation of Chinese state-owned enterprises is much better than the statistical point of view. A popular view is that one-third of that loss of state-owned enterprises, one third of the dark loss, only one-third profit. And my view is that many companies is that the loss of real profit, that profit real Italian. Of course, some companies do is that surplus real. But if you look at the ground, you will conclude that the profit of the company to conceal far more than false profits of the enterprise. Of course, this conclusion on the premise that you do not provide statistical reports to be deceived by the figures.
|